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REMARKS BY PJ MODE*  
There were two important events in January 1970.  First, I joined Senator 
Birch Bayh’s staff as his senior lawyer and chief counsel of the 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments.  Second, on January 19, 
President Richard Nixon, continuing to pursue his “Southern strategy” for 
reelection, nominated G. Harrold Carswell of Florida for a seat on the U.S. 
Supreme Court.1  Carswell had been a district judge for eleven years and had 
been elevated to the Fifth Circuit by Nixon only a few months before, over 
strong opposition from the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human 
Rights on account of his racist record.2  Early in his career, Carswell had 
happily announced himself a white supremacist for life, and his judicial 
record in civil rights cases was one of interminable delay, followed by 
unconscionable rulings, all the while abusing lawyers who were Black or 
represented civil rights interests.3  The civil rights community and organized 
labor were implacably opposed.4 
The problem was that no one thought there was any chance of defeating 
him.  The Senate had just months before rejected another Southern judge, 
Clement Haynsworth of South Carolina, in a bruising fight led by Birch 
Bayh, and everyone was certain that the next Nixon appointee would sail 
through the Senate.5  No one could see anywhere near fifty votes. 
Through Birch’s legislative skill, we managed to create some delay one 
bite at a time:  five weeks from committee hearings to floor debate, a one-
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week debate, and two and a half weeks to final vote.6  That provided some 
chance to build support. 
And when lawyers began to look at Carswell’s judicial record, we were 
able to open an entirely new front.  It turned out that, even putting aside the 
racism, he was patently unqualified.  He was lazy and unprofessional.  His 
writing was mechanical and incomprehensible.  His output of written 
opinions averaged sixteen pages a year, and those he did write were reversed 
at an alarming rate.7  A group of Columbia Law students did an astounding 
statistical study of 15,000 decisions by every district court judge in the Fifth 
Circuit over an eleven-year period—without LexisNexis and computers—
and found his reversal rate was 59 percent, three times the average rate.8  He 
ranked sixty-first of the sixty-seven judges on the circuit—and he was getting 
worse as time went on!9 
In the meantime, we had been working with a group of the nation’s most 
distinguished, establishment, white-shoe lawyers.  At a press conference we 
set up on March 11, they released a statement signed by 457 law school 
deans, professors, and establishment lawyers from around the country 
opposing Carswell.10  The statement concluded that aside from Carswell’s 
record of “white supremacy and ugly racism, he does not have the legal or 
mental qualifications essential for service on the Supreme Court or any high 
court in the land, including the one where he now sits.”11  The story ran on 
page one of the New York Times and everywhere else.12  We were 
immediately flooded with support from others around the country.  
Thereafter, anytime we needed to, we could generate support from the Salt 
Lake City Bar Association, to regional editorial boards in Hawaii, to the dean 
and faculty of the University of Arkansas School of Law. 
The opening day of debate, five days later, brought us unexpected good 
luck.  Frustrated by questions of Carswell’s competence, Senator Roman 
Hruska of Nebraska came off the Senate floor for a radio interview, in which 
he said, “Even if he were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and 
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people and lawyers, and they are entitled to a little representation, aren’t 
they?”13  Because there was audio, the statement had a massive impact. 
The final vote on April 8 was 51 to 45.14  The four absentees were evenly 
split.15  In the end, Nixon did not nominate another Southern racist to fill this 
seat.  Instead, he chose a virtually unknown judge from Minnesota, a 
dependable conservative named Harry Blackmun.16 
The most essential element in this victory was Birch Bayh’s political and 
legislative experience and skill:  in gaining delay, in exploiting errors on the 
other side, in motivating and huddling with the team of establishment lawyers 
and deans, in sensing how and where to focus the vast network of supporters 
we’d built. 
But most of all, Birch showed moral leadership by stepping up when no 
one wanted to.  Phillip Hart of Michigan and Joseph Tydings of Maryland 
were up for reelection.17  Ted Kennedy was maintaining a low profile as he 
sought to recover from the Chappaquiddick incident the previous July.18  
Birch had just led the bruising Haynsworth fight, and he was rightly fearful 
of damaging bipartisan relationships essential to his most important 
objective, the passage of electoral reform.19  At a time before the 
“mediocrity” issue had come into focus, at a time when it seemed to all of us 
that this was a losing fight—and knowing that he would pay a price for the 
decision—he nevertheless stepped up because he could not stand aside and 
see a white supremacist take a seat on the Supreme Court. 
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